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Abstract
It is extremely difficult to correct an error after conviction.
Given the Hidden Accidents Principle in criminal law, it is very
hard to uncover mistakes and even harder to prove them. Time is
one of the greatest enemies of reconstructing the truth. Evidence
gets lost, potential witnesses forget, move away, or die. The legal
rules, including the finality of verdicts rule, hinder the rectification
of miscarriages of justice. Another factor is that once the indictment
has been made, the police usually close their investigation. Even
when the appellate court finds a defect in the original trial
proceedings, it will most likely be deemed “harmless error.” Thus,
the finality of proceedings rule in fact already applies with the
handing down of the verdict at trial, even before appeal. The main
procedural mechanism intended for correcting miscarriages of
justice is a motion for a new trial. But this mechanism is not
effective. Since safety theory and safety measures are not yet
developed in the criminal justice system, we have to learn it from
other areas, such as aviation, transportation and engineering. In
order to bring SAFETY to post-conviction proceedings, this essay
offers some safety measures.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is extremely difficult to correct an error after conviction.
First of all, given the Hidden Accidents Principle in criminal law, it
is very hard to uncover mistakes and even harder to prove them. At
times, the very cause of the miscarriage of justice is what
perpetuates the injustice and prevents its rectification. Thus, in a
case in which the police or prosecution concealed possibly
exculpatory evidence, it can be very reasonably assumed that they
will continue to withhold that evidence and obstruct its discovery,
if only to prevent their own incrimination.
An additional, albeit innocent, contributing factor is that once
the indictment has been made, the police usually close their
investigation. No additional investigation angles are explored, and
they do not pursue any alternative suspects. The police assume
that the defendant who has been charged with the crime is the
actual perpetrator. Added to this is the natural reluctance of any
person or institution to admit to a mistake. Hence, innocent
suspects generally cannot expect the police to come to their rescue.
This is even more so for innocent convicted inmates, for their
conviction is accompanied by a presumption of their guilt.
Conducting an investigation into their matter is therefore regarded
as undermining the judicial system.
But if not the police, then who will find the true perpetrator of
the crime and prove the innocence of the wrongly convicted
defendant? The answer is: usually no one. The falsely convicted are
usually completely powerless. They are sometimes financially
destitute, particularly due to the huge amounts of money they have
spent on the trial and appeal, with no source of livelihood while
imprisoned.
A study conducted by Hugo A. Bedau and Michael L. Radelet
found that in cases in which a miscarriage of justice was revealed, it
was often by a conscience-driven attorney who had continued to work
on the case free of charge for all the long years.1 But although this was
indeed the reality in the past, today the Innocence Project plays a
central role in exposing false convictions in the United States, based
on DNA comparisons.2
In the United Kingdom, the traditional conventional belief that
false convictions do not occur was shaken to the core with the
exposure of the wrongful convictions of Irish individuals due to the
predatory investigations of the British police in the notorious
“Birmingham Six”3 and “Guildford Four”4 cases. Following these
1. Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in
Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 67 (1987).
2. See About, INNOCENCE PROJECT, www.innocenceproject.org/about (last
visited Sept. 19, 2018) (detailing the Innocence Project’s objectives).
3. R v. McIlkenny (1991) 93 Cr. App. R. 287.
4. R v. Richardson, THE TIMES, Oct. 20, 1989, 1989 WL 651412 (C.A. Crim.
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revelations, the Runciman Royal Commission on Criminal Justice
was appointed to investigate the English criminal justice system and
to recommend improvements. Its final report in 1993 led to a drastic
change in the English approach to the phenomenon of false
convictions.5 The Criminal Cases Review Commission (“CCRC”) was
established pursuant to this report to review claims of false
conviction.6 It is an independent public body that serves as a
mechanism of last resort, after the judicial process has been
exhausted.7 The CCRC conducts its own inquiry into the cases and
convictions and refers suitable cases to the court of appeal.8 In a
considerable number of these cases (twenty-one per year on average)
the courts have found a miscarriage of justice and have exonerated
and released wrongfully convicted inmates.9
The passage of time also works to the detriment of someone
who has been the victim of a miscarriage of justice. The more time
that passes, the harder it is to uncover the truth. Time is one of the
greatest enemies of reconstructing the truth. Evidence gets lost and
potential witnesses forget, move away, or die. The legal rules,
including, first and foremost, the finality of verdicts rule (on which
I elaborate below) hinder the rectification of miscarriages of justice.
From the moment that a person is wrongfully convicted, it is very
difficult to reverse the outcome. As I will show in what follows, the
appeals procedure is very limited, tending to focus primarily on
questions of law and constitutional issues and not on questions of
fact, even though the majority of false convictions apparently stem
from fact-finding errors. As I show below, even when the appellate
court finds a defect in the original trial proceedings, it will most
likely be deemed “harmless error.” Thus, the finality of proceedings
rule, in fact, already applies with the handing down of the verdict
at trial, even before appeal. The main procedural mechanism
intended for correcting miscarriages of justice is a motion for a new
trial. But is this mechanism effective? This will also be considered
Div. 1989).
5. ROYAL COMM’N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT, 1993, CM. 2263, at 10
[hereinafter RUNCIMAN COMMISSION REPORT].
6. Lissa Griffin, The Correction of Wrongful Convictions: A Comparative
Perspective, 16 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1241, 1276 (2001). See also CRIMINAL CASES
REVIEW COMM’N, www.ccrc.gov.uk (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (describing the
work of the CCRC).
7. Griffin, supra note 6, at 1277; Who we are, CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW
COMM’N, www.ccrc.gov.uk/about-us/who-we-are/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2018);
What we do, CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N, www.ccrc.gov.uk/aboutus/what-we-do (last visited Sept. 19, 2018).
8. What we do, supra note 7.
9. From its establishment in April 1997 and up until July 2018, the CCRC
had transferred 652 files it deemed suitable to the court of appeals for
reconsideration. CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 6, Facts and
Figures: Case Statistics. Of those, 642 have been heard by the appeal courts.
432 appeals have been allowed (21 per year), and 196 dismissed. Id. 627 cases
are currently under review at the Commission and 235 are awaiting review. Id.
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below.10
In certain fields, the meaning of a “safety-critical system”11 is
well understood, and resources are, therefore, invested in modern
safety methods, which significantly reduce the rate of accidents.
This is the case, for example, in the field of pharmaceuticals and
drugs, where in the first half of the twentieth-century the need for
safety was already acknowledged and internalized and the
necessary powers and authorities were granted to the FDA to
ensure this. This was also the case in the aviation field, which
abandoned the obsolete “Fly-Fix-Fly” approach in the midtwentieth century and developed more advanced safety methods
that generally follow an “Identify-Analyze-Control” model and are
aimed at “First-Time-Safe.”12 The latter approach involves
systematic identification of future hazards, analysis of the
probability of their occurrence, and complete neutralization of the
risk or at least its reduction to an acceptable level.13 Modern safety
approaches such as these were implemented in other fields as well,
such as transportation and engineering, and, later on, labor and
medicine.14 These safety systems are constructed on, among other
things, safety education and training, a culture of safety, a duty to
report not only accidents but also incidents (near-accidents),
professional risk assessment, a process of perpetual improvement,
and the understanding that safety in each component of a system
alone in detachment from the entire system is not sufficient for
achieving system safety.15
Accidents also happen in the criminal justice system, of course,
in the form of false convictions. For this reason, this system must
also be classified as a safety-critical system. As systems of this type
entail matters of life and death, any system error is likely to cause
severe harm to both individuals and society at large. A false
conviction is a system error and accident just like a combat-plane
crash, not only from a metaphorical perspective but also in the very

10. There is a pessimistic estimation that the adjudicatory process has only
limited capability to distinguish between accurate and inaccurate evidence and
that “criminal verdicts are determined in the investigative phase, with the trial
serving primarily as a ritual that delivers more symbolic than diagnostic value.”
DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL J USTICE PROCESS
203 (2012).
11. In a co-authored article, we have suggested applying this term to the
criminal justice system. Mordechai Halpert & Boaz Sangero, From a Plane
Crash to the Conviction of an Innocent Person: Why Forensic Science Evidence
Should Be Inadmissible Unless It Has Been Developed as a Safety-Critical
System, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 65 (2009). See infra section II, subsections C-E
regarding “Safety-critical system.”
12. Boaz Sangero & Mordechai Halpert, A Safety Doctrine for the Criminal
Justice System, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1293, 1296-97 (2011).
13. Id. at 1297.
14. Id. at 1297-99.
15. Id. at 1299.
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realistic terms of economic cost.16 Yet, in criminal law, a Hidden
Accidents Principle governs.17 Thus, the overwhelming majority of
false convictions are never detected, which leads to the erroneous
traditional and conservative assumption that they occur at an
almost negligible rate and that the criminal justice system is
“almost” perfect. Consequently, little thought has ever been given
to safety in the system, and therefore the criminal justice system —
from a safety perspective — lags far behind other areas of life.
The patently flawed assumption of a low false conviction rate
has been challenged in recent decades, primarily because of the
work of the Innocence Project. The Project exposes hundreds of
cases of false convictions through genetic testing.18 Empirical
studies based on the Project’s findings point to a very high false
conviction rate: at least 5 percent for the most serious crimes19 and
apparently an even higher rate for less serious crimes.
This Essay proceeds as follows. Part I connects between the
modern theory of safety (which is well developed in other areas of
our life) and the new theory of safety from false convictions. It starts
from the phenomenon of false convictions, moves to risk
assessment, establishes the moral duty to adopt safety measures,
explores the new area of safety from false convictions, suggests
adopting modern safety, and ends with showing the unsafety in the
criminal justice system. Part II shows the current state of unsafety
in post-conviction proceedings. It begins with a discussion of the
finality of verdicts rule, which gains undue force, then turns to the
appeal procedure and shows why it cannot correct mistaken
convictions, continues with the procedure of new trial, showing the
difference between reality (DNA) and dream (“harmless error”) and
ends with new post-conviction proceedings legislation. Part III
offers some possible safety measures. A short conclusion ends the
Essay.

16. Id. at 1304-05. Incorporating into the criminal justice system a modern
safety theory that is commonly accepted in other areas, such as space, aviation,
engineering, and transportation, is an idea that was developed jointly by myself
and Dr. Halpert and presented in a number of co-authored articles, particularly
A Safety Doctrine for the Criminal Justice System, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1293,
1296-97 (2011). This Essay is intended to expand on the preliminary
proposition and engage in the application of the modern safety theory in the
criminal justice system, specifically regarding post-conviction proceedings.
17. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 12, at 1314-16.
18. Exonerate the Innocent, INNOCENCE PROJECT, www.innocenceproject.org/
exonerate (last visited Oct. 18, 2018).
19. D. Michael Risinger Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified
Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 786-88
(2007).
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II. SAFETY FROM FALSE CONVICTIONS
A. False Convictions
It is most convenient for us to hold our criminal law system in
high regard, to the point of calling it the “criminal justice system.”
It is convenient for us to think that everything runs as it should in
this system. And even if certain doubts creep in at times, we tend
to repress them and stand firm in our ignorance.
The state can inflict no greater injustice on its citizens than to
systematically falsely convict the innocent. In the past, it was
possible to call into question the actual occurrence of false
convictions and consider this, at most, a negligible phenomenon.20
However, today such skepticism has no place and likely derives
mainly from ignorance. This is principally due to the “DNA
revolution” and the first Innocence Project at the Cardozo School of
Law at Yeshiva University in the United States.21 In the framework
of this Innocence Project, genetic comparisons are conducted
between samples taken from inmates and samples that have been
preserved from crime scenes.22 On the basis of the testing initiated
by the original Innocence Project (today there are similar additional
projects in the United States and elsewhere), about four hundred
false convictions have been exposed, the majority of which were for
the serious offenses of rape and murder, which carry the harshest
possible penalties: life imprisonment or capital punishment.23
Moreover, in about half of the cases,24 genetic testing even led to the
identification of the true perpetrators of the crimes, who had
roamed free due to the false convictions and, in some cases, even
continued to commit crimes. In addition, recent studies have shown
that false convictions are not an uncommon phenomenon.25 These
findings make a renewed, more realistic consideration of the issue
imperative.

B. Risk Assessment
Empirical studies based on the Innocence Project’s findings
20. See, e.g., JUSTICE IN ERROR 16 (Clive Walker & Keir Starmer eds., 1993)
(stating this approach — while expressing reservations about it).
21. BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION
AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000); BRANDON L.
GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO
WRONG (2011); INNOCENCE PROJECT, www.innocenceproject.org (last visited
Sept. 19, 2018).
22. INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 21.
23. Exonerate the Innocent, supra note 18. On October 18, 2018 the exact
number was 362. Id.
24. Id. On October 18, 2018 the exact number was 158. Id.
25. See generally Richard A. Leo, The Criminology of Wrongful Conviction:
A Decade Later, 33 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 82 (2017) (containing a new
almost-updated survey of the literature in this field).
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point to a very high false conviction rate. According to Michael
Risinger's research, the rate of false convictions is 5 percent for the
most serious crimes — rape and murder.26 One of the most
impactful works on the exposure of wrongful convictions is Samuel
R. Gross and Michael Shaffer’s study, entitled Exonerations in the
United States, 1989-2012 — Report by the National Registry of
Exonerations.27 The researchers gathered data on the exoneration
of wrongfully convicted defendants in the United States, including
(but not limited to) exonerations based on DNA comparative
testing.28 The database encompasses an impressive number of
exonerations: 891 exonerations of individuals, of which
approximately one-third were based on DNA comparisons and an
additional 1170 individuals cleared in “group exonerations.”29
Altogether, these amounted to a total of 2061 official exonerations
of wrongly convicted, innocent defendants who were sentenced to
prison or even death.30 Moreover, as of September 2018, there were
2267 registered exonerations in the National Registry of
Exonerations.31
In 2014, Gross et al. published their study on “Rates of False
Conviction of Criminal Defendants who are Sentenced to Death.”32
The researchers estimated that if all death-sentenced defendants
were to remain under sentence of death indefinitely, at least 4.1
percent would be exonerated, but concluded this to be “a
conservative estimate” of the proportion of false convictions among
death sentences in the United States, and that it is almost certain
that the actual proportion is significantly higher (i.e., 4.1 percent is
the greatest lower bound).33 Moreover, a fascinating empirical study
initiated and funded by the State of Virginia supports an even
higher estimate of the false conviction rate — about 15 percent (!).34
26. Risinger, supra note 19.
27. SAMUEL R. GROSS & MICHAEL SHAFFER, EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1989-2012: REPORT BY THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS
(2012).
28. Id.
29. These group exonerations were in the framework of twelve different
instances of police corruption, where in each case, police officers had
deliberately and systematically incriminated innocent citizens with false claims
and fabricated evidence in order to gain promotions. GROSS & SHAFFER, supra
note 27, at 3.
30. Id.
31. NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/about.aspx (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (“Currently 2,267
exonerations - more than 20,080 years lost”).
32. Samuel R. Gross, Barbara O’Brien, Chen Hu & Edward H. Kennedy,
Rate of False Conviction of Criminal Defendants Who Are Sentenced to Death,
111 PROC. NAT’L ACADEMY SCI. 7230 (2014).
33. Id.
34. See generally JOHN ROMAN, KELLY WALSH, PAMELA LACHMAN &
JENNIFER YAHNER, POST-CONVICTION DNA TESTING AND WRONGFUL
CONVICTION (2012) (providing a research report submitted to the U.S.
Department of Justice).
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Thus, the false conviction rate in the most severe offenses can
be reasonably estimated as somewhere between 5 percent and 10
percent. And as it is reasonable to assume that courts are less
cautious with regard to less serious offenses than those examined
in the studies reviewed above, it is likely that the general false
conviction rate is significantly higher than 5 percent.
These numbers remove any doubt as to the occurrence of false
convictions. The question now, however, is with what frequency
they occur, and what can be done to diminish their incidence.
False convictions cause an enormous harm — not just to the
innocent defendants, their families, and their friends, but also to
society as a whole. The falsely convicted individual bears the
primary injury in the very fact of being convicted, the accompanying
stigma, and the actual punishment, which can range from a
monetary fine to imprisonment, to loss of life in jurisdictions
allowing the death penalty.35 Studies have been conducted on the
harm caused by imprisonment for many years, but only in the last
decade have the particular harms of wrongful imprisonment —
some irreversible — been researched.36

C. The Moral Duty To Adopt Safety Measures
There is a moral duty to adopt safety measures based on social
theories, such as the social contract theory, and legal doctrines,
such as the state-created danger doctrine.37 The conviction of an
innocent person is an enormous injustice.
Although many are willing to accept rare occurrences of
wrongful convictions as an unavoidable phenomenon, sooner or
later it will become common public knowledge that not only are false
convictions not a rarity, but law enforcement authorities make no
significant effort to diminish their incidence. This is likely to
strongly shake existing public confidence and trust in the criminal
law enforcement system, which is still referred to as “the criminal
justice system.” In other words, even disregarding due process, if we
want to preserve public faith in the criminal justice system so that
it can continue to perform its function of crime control,38 it is vital
35. Mary C. Delaney, Keith A. Findley & Sheila Sullivan, Exonerees’ Hardships after
Freedom, 83 WIS. LAW. 18 (2010); Saundra D. Westervelt & Kimberly J. Cook, Framing
Innocents: The Wrongly Convicted as Victims of State Harm, 53 CRIME L. & SOC.
CHANGE 259 (2010).
36. Westervelt & Cook, supra note 35; Heather Weigand, Rebuilding a Life:
The Wrongfully Convicted and Exonerated, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 427 (2009);
Delaney, Findley & Sullivan, supra note 35; JAMES R. ACKER & ALLISON D.
REDLICH, WRONGFUL CONVICTION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 590-606 (2011);
Leslie Scott, “It Never Ends”: The Psychological Impacts of Wrongful Conviction,
5 AM. U. CRIM. L. BRIEF 10 (2010).
37. Laura Oren, Safari into the Snake Pit: The State-Created Danger Doctrine, 13
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1165 (2005).
38. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 149-73

2018]

Safety in Post-Conviction Proceedings

781

that safety standards be implemented to decrease the rate of false
convictions.
Social contract theory also provides a rationale for imposing a
moral duty on the state to institute safety in criminal justice. Under
this theory, the state was created in order to safeguard the rights of
society’s members, not to cause them injury, and as noted, false
conviction is the greatest wrong that a state routinely inflicts upon
its citizens.39 Thus, from the social contract perspective, the state,
as the creator of the risk of false convictions, bears a heightened
moral duty in the context of criminal justice — as compared to other
contexts — to take safety measures to alleviate this risk.40 Yet
beyond its theoretical declaration that guilt must be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt, the state makes no meaningful attempt to
reduce the risk of an innocent person being falsely convicted.41
Criminal law, in fact, lacks even the most basic concept of modern
system-safety, without even the most rudimentary and simple
safety measures implemented to reduce the risk of false
convictions.42

D. Safety From False Convictions
On this background, this Essay explores ways of reducing the
false conviction rate. The view advanced here is that the criminal
justice system can be categorized as what is termed in safety
engineering as a “safety-critical system.”43 As systems of this type
entail matters of life and death, any system error is likely to cause
severe harm to both individuals and society at large. A false
conviction is a system error and accident just like a combat-plane

(1968).
39. Rinat Kitai, Protecting the Guilty, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1163, 1172-79,
1186-87 (2003); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 12, at 1303.
40. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 12, at 1303.
41. Id.
42. See generally Halpert & Sangero, supra note 11; James M. Doyle,
Learning from Error in American Criminal Justice, 100 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 109 (2010); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 12; James M. Doyle,
An Etiology of Wrongful Convictions: Error, Safety, and Forward-Looking
Accountability in Criminal Justice, in WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE REFORM: MAKING JUSTICE 56 (Marvin Zalman & Julia Carrano eds.,
2014); James M. Doyle, Learning from Error in the Criminal Justice System:
Sentinel Event Reviews, in U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. JUSTICE, NCJ
247141, MENDING JUSTICE: SENTINEL EVENT REVIEWS 3 (2014); Boaz Sangero,
Safety from False Confessions, 54 CRIM. L. BULL. 25 (2018); Boaz Sangero,
Safety from Plea-Bargains' Hazards, 38 PACE L. REV. 301 (2018); Boaz Sangero,
Safety from Flawed Forensic Sciences Evidence, 34 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1129
(2018); Rinat Kitai-Sangero, Changing the Paradigm of Models to Safety and
Hazards, 55 CRIM. L. BULL. (forthcoming, March 2019).
43. See Halpert & Sangero, supra note 11 (suggesting applying the term
“safety-critical system" to the criminal justice system). See also Sangero &
Halpert, supra note 12, at 1300-01) (developing this suggestion).
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crash, not only from a metaphorical perspective, but also in the very
realistic terms of economic cost.44
This Essay argues for the formulation and application of a
safety theory in the criminal justice system at large and specifically
regarding post-conviction proceedings. This would not be simply by
raising the beyond-reasonable-doubt bar, thereby increasing the
number of acquittals and decreasing the number of convictions.
Rather, by implementing reasonable safety measures whose costs
are lower than their expected harm due to the resulting reduction
of both the number of false acquittals and the number of false
convictions.45

E. Modern Safety
Modern safety began to develop following World War II.46 Until
then, the safety approach in the field of aeronautics had been “FlyFix-Fly”: an airplane would be flown until an accident occurred, the
causes of the accident would be investigated and the defects
repaired, and then the airplane would resume flight.47 This method
was based on a system of learning from past experience to repair
product defects and flaws and prevent future mishaps.48 However,
such a system does not safeguard against future mishaps that can
be caused by other, as-yet undetected, defects.49 This approach
became clearly inadequate with the rapid advances in aviation
technology and rising costs of airplanes.50 This made learning from
experience too expensive, leading to a shift in approach over a half
century ago and the birth of modern safety.51
At this point, the primary objective in the safety field became
preventing accidents before they occur, thereby avoiding the high
costs of learning through experience.52 The “Fly-Fix-Fly” approach
was thus replaced by the “Identify-Analyze-Control” method, with
its aim of “First-Time-Safe.”53 Under the latter approach, there is
systematic identification of future hazards, analysis of the
probability of their occurrence, and a complete neutralization of the
risk — or at least its reduction to an acceptable level.54
Modern safety approaches such as these were implemented in
other fields as well, such as transportation and engineering, and

44. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 12, at 1304-05.
45. Id. at 1301.
46. Id. at 1296.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 12, at 1296-97.
50. Id. at 1297.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 12, at 1297.
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later on, labor and medicine.55 These safety systems are constructed
on, among other things: safety education and training, a culture of
safety, a duty to report not only accidents but also incidents (nearaccidents), professional risk assessment, a process of perpetual
improvement, and the understanding that safety in each component
of a system alone in detachment from the entire system is not
sufficient for achieving system safety.56
The First-Time-Safe approach should be adopted in the field of
criminal justice. Modern system-safety has been developed in fields
such as military aviation, engineering, and medical diagnostic
devices. The legal system should and can learn from the engineering
field. For example, there is a duty in engineering safety to report
not only accidents but also “incidents,” defined as situations in
which there was potential for harm to be caused and it was averted
purely by coincidence.57 It is important to recognize the fact that
near-miss conditions, if not rectified, most likely will develop into
accidents at a later point. In contrast, “incidents” in criminal law
are completely ignored. Even worse, accidents are not always
investigated either.58
The three basic stages of the system-safety process are:
Identify, Analyze, and Control. Risk assessment is vital, for it
produces meaningful data to guide in prioritizing hazards,
allocating resources, and evaluating the acceptability of risks
associated with these hazards.

F. Unsafety in the Criminal Justice System
The obvious question that arises is why safety measures have
yet to be implemented in criminal law. Moreover, why has the
system never even adopted a Fly-Fix-Fly approach? The answers to
these questions are related to the general inability to detect the
occurrence of false convictions, which are typically indiscernible.
This can account for the optimistic false impression that false
convictions are a very rare phenomenon. Despite all indications of
a conceivably very high rate of false convictions, policymakers and
the public alike are certain and confident that the system performs
well and that there is no need to invest resources in safety
measures.59 This aspect of criminal law is so fundamental that it
amounts to a principle: what I have termed elsewhere, with Dr.
Halpert, the “Hidden Accidents Principle” of the criminal justice
55. Id. at 1297-99.
56. Id. at 1299.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 12, at 1295. Another possible explanation
is the erroneous idea that whereas unsafe airplanes pose a risk to all of “us,” an
unsafe criminal justice system is a risk only to “them” — that is, potential
criminals. Id. at 1314. I thank Prof. Alon Harel for this remark.
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system.60
According to the Hidden Accidents Principle in criminal law,
an effective feedback for the criminal justice system is implausible,
even in theory.61 The only way to introduce safety into this system,
therefore, is through comparison with fields in which mishaps are
seen and can be detected.62 The Hidden Accidents Principle is
evidence of the inadequacy of the Fly-Fix-Fly safety method for
criminal law, because of the extreme difficulty of learning from the
experience of past accidents in the system when they are a hidden
phenomenon.

III. CURRENT UNSAFETY IN POST-CONVICTION
PROCEEDINGS
A. Finality of Verdicts Rule
Finality of legal proceedings is not a value in and of itself, but
rather a means of attaining other goals. These goals must be closely
examined so as to, on the one hand, justify the finality rule; while,
on the other hand, set its boundaries and exceptions. A central goal
of the finality of verdicts rule is to preserve the deterrence generated
by the verdict by preventing additional appeal.63 Once a judgment
has been rendered and the right to appeal exhausted, the tendency
is to leave no hope of continuing the legal proceedings.64 The
aspiration is to accord the judgment maximum stability so as to
sustain its deterrent effect.65 In addition, the knowledge that the
legal determination is only temporary detracts from its value. It
might also inhibit the healing of victims.
Efficiency considerations support the finality of verdicts rule.
If a convicted defendant were allowed to appeal interminably, as
long as he wishes, there would be no end to the process, the verdict
judgment would have little value, and it is expected that the
overloaded courts would be incapable of fulfilling their role. Thus,
there is both a general and administrative interest in legal
proceedings coming to an end.
Nevertheless, one may wonder whether the pursuit of the truth
and doing justice can be abandoned only due to the costs of further
investigation. The hazard that must be weighed against the
justifications for the finality of verdicts rule is the horrific prospect
of wrongful conviction and its possible outcomes: that the lives of
the falsely convicted defendant and his or her family members will

60. Id. at 1314-16.
61. Id. at 1315.
62. Id.
63. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989).
64. Id. at 295.
65. Id. at 309.
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be destroyed; that the true criminal will roam free and might even
commit more crimes; and that public confidence in the justice
system will be undermined. In my estimation, in the current legal
situation, too much weight is accorded to the finality of verdicts
rule.66 As discussed in section C infra, in the context of motions for
a new trial on a claim of actual innocence, upholding the rule comes
at the expense of the inherent value of uncovering the truth.

B. Appeal
In the American system, all convicted defendants have a right
of first appeal.67 However, the appeal cannot contest the evidence
submitted at trial, for it is aimed at correcting legal or judicial error
and not errors of fact.68 Thus, appeals deal almost exclusively with
procedural errors, and the appellate courts usually lack the
authority to deliberate regarding new evidence or reverse a
conviction due to jury error.69 Despite a defendant’s due process
right not to be convicted on insufficient evidence, the Supreme
Court ruled in Jackson v. Virginia that it is sufficient that “after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”70 Consequently, the appeal
process does not efficiently ensure the exoneration of defendants
who were wrongly convicted. As Thomas has asserted, “[t]he notion
of ‘elusive truth’ helps explain why American criminal appeals are
almost exclusively about procedural errors rather than whether the
convicted defendant was guilty of the crime. If truth is elusive, who
can say that the jury was wrong?”71 He compares the American
system to continental systems, where “getting the facts right is
normally one of the preconditions to realizing the goal of the legal
process.”72 In contrast, American appellate courts are strongly
averse to intervening in the factual determinations made at trial.73
One explanation for the current ineffectiveness of appeals in
66. Even in capital cases, the courts emphasize the need for finality. See
generally SIMON, supra note 10, at 213 (making this observation).
67. Craig M. Bradley, United States in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE
STUDY, 519, 546-47 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2nd ed. 2007).
68. Lissa Griffin, Correcting Injustice: Studying How the United Kingdom
and the United States Review Claims of Innocence, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 107, 109
(2009).
69. GEORGE C. THOMAS III, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: HOW THE
AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM SACRIFICES INNOCENT DEFENDANTS, 214-19 (2008);
Samuel R. Gross, Pretrial Incentives, Post-conviction Review, and Sorting
Criminal Prosecutions by Guilt or Innocence, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1009, 1021
(2011-2012); Griffin, supra note 6, at 1271.
70. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
71. THOMAS, supra note 69, at 1.
72. Id. at 1-2. See also id. at 172, 214-19 (comparing the American criminal
appeal procedure to the French and to the German procedures).
73. SIMON, supra note 10, at 212.
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correcting wrongful convictions is the nature of the jury system.74
As the jury determines questions of fact and gives only a verdict of
guilty or not-guilty without any details or reasoning, it is indeed
difficult for the appellate court to review and find error in the
factual determinations that led to the conviction of an innocent
defendant.75 Therefore, recommendations for improving the appeal
process can be implemented primarily with regard to bench trials,
where the fact-finder is a professional judge. But either way, the
appeal procedure in its current form is not an effective mechanism
for correcting factual errors that led to a false conviction.

C. New Trial: Reality (DNA) or Dream (“Harmless
Error”)?
“Exoneration” is defined as “an official act declaring a
defendant not guilty of a crime for which he or she had previously
been convicted.”76 There are different sources of exonerations:
acquittal in new trial, dismissal of conviction by the court based on
new evidence, pardon based on innocence, and posthumous
acknowledgment by the state that a prisoner who died in prison was
factually innocent.77
The harmless error doctrine is likely the biggest obstacle to
obtaining a new trial. Even when faced with a constitutional
violation,78 appellate courts must deny relief if the prosecution can
show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error was harmless (or,
in habeas corpus procedure, “did not substantially contribute to the
conviction”).79 The rationale offered for this rule is that because
convicted defendants are allegedly almost always actually guilty,
there should be finality to a conviction.80 Thus, appellate courts can
hold a constitutional error to be “harmless” if they find that other
evidence presented to the jury could support the conviction.81 In the
74. The accused has a right to a jury for the initial trial. Appeals are decided by bench
trial.
75. As opposed to the reasoned verdict of judges and also of the jury in Spain.
Mar Jimeno-Bulnes, Deliberation In 12 Angry Men, 82 CHI. KENT L. REV. 759,
760 (2007).
76. Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States, 1989 through
2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 524 (2005).
77. Id.
78. Unless resulting from a structural defect. See Arizona v. Fulminante,
499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991) (excluding structural defects in the trial
mechanisms – such as the absolute denial of the right to counsel, judicial
neutrality, unjustified dismissal of a jury member belonging to the same racial
group as the defendant, denial of the right to self-representation, etc. – from
the “harmless error” test).
79. Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 1698
(2008).
80. Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongful
Conviction Law, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 35, 36 (2005).
81. Id.
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legal literature, the doctrine of harmless error has been described
as “basically a judicial assurance that nearly anything will be
tolerated in regard to an obviously guilty defendant,”82 and as
“create[ing] a firewall between constitutional rights and remedies”
as an empirical matter.83
Strict retroactivity rules, moreover, preclude the application of
changes in law to preexisting convictions.84 Thus, the emergence of
a “successful corrective system” is hindered by “the demanding
standard of review used by U.S. courts, combined with strict
retroactivity rules, a refusal to discover newly discovered
impeachments evidence, and a reluctance to test convictions
against developments in modern science.”85 Although a convicted
defendant who has new evidence of his innocence has the right to
apply for a new trial, the motion must be made before the same
judge who convicted him, which inevitably leads to institutional
bias.86 Compounding all this are short statutes of limitations,87 the
high standard of proof the defendant must meet (namely, showing
that the new evidence probably would have produced a different
result at trial),88 and the disallowance of impeachment evidence as
a basis for relief in most state jurisdictions.89
Another obstacle is State limits on post-conviction
investigations. State judges and legislators place obstacles to postconviction investigation by restricting defense counsel's ability to
interview certain witnesses: jurors, victims, and State witnesses.90
These limits undermine the ability to uncover constitutional errors,
which lead to wrongful convictions.
If relief is unavailable in the state court, a wrongly convicted
defendant can resort to a federal writ of habeas corpus. But “federal
courts award relief in only 0.4 percent of the noncapital habeas
corpus cases.”91 Moreover, since Herrera v. Collins, the Supreme
Court has rejected factual innocence as a basis for relief, except in
capital cases,92 holding that federal habeas review is intended only
82. Id. at 36 n.2 (quoting JOSEPH F. LAWLESS, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT:
LAW, PROCEDURE, FORMS, at xii-xiii (2d ed. 1999)).
83. Id. (quoting Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies
Split, 88 VA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2002)).
84. Griffin, supra note 68, at 141. But see Dov Fox & Alex Stein,
Constitutional Retroactivity in Criminal Procedure, 91 WASH. L. REV. 463
(2016) (showing an influence of the possibility of “watersheds” on the criminal
proceedings).
85. Griffin, supra note 68, at 107-08.
86. Id. at 134.
87. Id. at 141-42.
88. Id. at 137-40.
89. Id. at 144-47.
90. Kathryn E. Miller, The Attorneys Are Bound and The Witnesses Are
Gagged: State Limits on Post-Conviction Investigation in Criminal Cases, 106
CAL. L. REV. 135 (2018).
91. SIMON, supra note 10, at 212.
92. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 555 (2006). See also Griffin, supra note 68,
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“to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the
Constitution — not to correct errors of fact.”93 Accordingly, the
Court has never released a person on federal habeas grounds
because he was actually innocent.94 Considerations of finality and
reliability are suggested as underlying the Court’s approach95
because, in the Court’s words, “the passage of time only diminishes
the reliability of criminal adjudications” due to the “erosion of
memory and desperation of witnesses.”96 But Herrera preceded the
DNA revolution, and reliable DNA evidence can be generated even
decades after the crime was committed. Therefore, even though the
Herrera rule itself has not been overturned, the federal legislature
and most state legislatures have amended the procedural rules to
allow convicts to get a new trial based on DNA evidence.97

D. New Post-Conviction Proceedings Legislation
The Innocence Protection Act of 2004 led to three positive
developments. First, it allows a convicted defendant in federal cases
who is “under a sentence of imprisonment or sentence of death” to
apply for post-conviction DNA testing, subject to certain
limitations.98 The Act requires that biological evidence in federal
cases be preserved while an individual is imprisoned, and allocates
federal funds to states to assist with the costs of post-conviction
DNA testing.99 The second improvement is that the Act allows for
grants to states to “establish, implement, and improve an effective
system for providing competent legal representation” to indigent
capital defendants.100 Third, the Act increased the amount of
compensation that can be awarded to exonerated prisoners in
federal criminal cases.101
Certainly, this legislation is a step in the right direction. Yet it
amounts to only a partial solution. To begin with, only state
defendants who have been charged with a capital offense or
sentenced to death benefit from the improvement in lawyering

at 136 (analyzing this rule); Thomas, supra note 69, at 166-67 (analyzing this
rule).
93. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400, 416 (1993).
94. Michael E. Kleinert, Improving the Quality of Justice: The Innocence
Protection Act of 2004 Ensures Post-conviction DNA Testing, Better Legal
Representation, and Increased Compensation for the Wrongfully Imprisoned, 44
BRANDEIS L.J. 491, 500 (2006).
95. Garrett, supra note 79, at 1699-704.
96. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 403-04.
97. As discussed in section D infra, p. 788.
98. Kleinert, supra note 94, at 501 (citing section 411 of the 2004 Innocence
Protection Act).
99. Id. at 503 (citing sections 411-413 of the 2004 Innocence Protection Act).
100. Id. at 504 (citing section 421 of the 2004 Innocence Protection Act).
101. Id. at 505 (citing section 431 of the 2004 Innocence Protection Act).
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quality.102 Moreover, all three new arrangements under the Act
(ensuring post-conviction DNA testing, legal representation, and
increased compensation for the wrongfully imprisoned) should not
be limited to federal cases, but extended also to state convicts, all
offenses, and all types of punishments. Most important, however, as
DNA testing is viable only in rare instances, the Innocence Act
should apply to any type of new evidence with the potential of
proving innocence.
Almost all states have enacted statutes allowing relief based
on new evidence of innocence, usually DNA evidence.103 But these
statutes set arbitrary restrictions that deny DNA testing for some
and preclude relief in many cases even where innocence has been
shown.104 Most of the state statutes, for example, allow postconviction DNA testing, but not other kinds of evidence as the basis
for relief. The most prevalent restrictions in these statutes are
guilty-plea exclusions (which, in practice, mean the majority of
criminal cases are excluded – beyond 94%105), custody
requirements, due diligence requirements, and a requirement that
the technology has advanced since the trial.106 Many states limit
DNA testing to specified serious crimes or require that the
petitioner be incarcerated or in custody in order to obtain testing.107
Moreover, some states require that identity was an issue at trial,
thereby precluding relief in cases where a guilty plea was made.108
As the empirical aspect of the exonerations was described by
Gross: “[t]hese are the exonerations we hear about in the news. But
they are very uncommon — perhaps fifty a year, at present, in a
country with over a million felony convictions annually,
overwhelmingly in murder and rape cases, on average about ten
years after conviction.”109

IV. SAFETY MEASURES
There can be no doubt that significant changes are vital to
improve the legal reality of post-conviction proceedings in line with
the proposed safety principles. First and foremost, safety must be
implemented not only during the investigation and trial
proceedings, but also after conviction. As conviction does not require
certainty of guilt, the terms for allowing convicted defendants
102. Id. at 508.
103. Garrett, supra note 79, at 1716.
104. Id. at 1717.
105. In practice, only three percent of all federal cases go to trial, and only
six percent of state cases. See generally Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143
(2012) (mentioning this data); see also Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012)
(mentioning the same data).
106. Garrett, supra note 79, at 1717.
107. Id. at 1679-80.
108. Id.
109. Gross, supra note 69, at 1022.
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access to DNA testing should be lenient, for example, without
setting any time limit on this access.110 Ensuring the preservation
of DNA samples after conviction is also, therefore, vital.
Second, given the proposed principle of an ongoing endeavor to
exhaust all potential evidence so as to uncover the truth and in light
of the overwhelming asymmetry between the state’s power and
defendants’ power, I contend that defense attorneys (and
defendants) should be allowed to submit potentially exculpatory
evidence at all stages of the process: at trial, on appeal, and in
motions for a new trial. This, of course, should not be limited only
to DNA evidence but should rather extend to any evidence that can
shed light on the truth. If the system truly seeks to uncover the
truth, ensure that justice is done, and prevent further false
convictions, it is duty-bound to implement the proposed safety rule.
Third, it is vital that claims of actual innocence be investigated
at any stage that they are raised, without any time limit or
procedural obstacles. The finality of verdicts rule has been given an
inflated status in criminal law and must be relaxed to facilitate
comprehensive evaluation of actual innocence claims and the
exoneration of falsely convicted defendants. Post-conviction
proceedings must not be restricted to examining flaws of only a
certain type, such as violations of constitutional rights. With all due
respect to the Constitution, protecting the innocent from false
conviction is no less of an important goal than protecting
constitutional rights. Moreover, defendants’ constitutional rights —
such as the right to counsel, right to silence, and right to confront
the prosecution’s witnesses against her — are, it could be argued,
intended primarily to protect the innocent. Regardless, however,
these two important objectives should not compete against one
another, but rather, complement each other.
A number of different recommendations have been made in the
legal literature for reforming the system that, in my opinion, have
great potential for improving the situation, although each one, of
course, would have to be assessed for effectivity following
implementation. To begin with, some scholars have proposed
adopting the “unsafe verdict” standard in post-conviction
proceedings in which a claim of actual innocence has been made.
Under this standard, which is currently applied in English law, if
the prosecution is unable to show that the conviction is “safe,” the
defendant is granted a new trial or immediate exoneration.111 As D.
Michael Risinger has explained,

110. Access to Post-Conviction DNA Testing, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
www.innocenceproject.org/access-post-conviction-dna-testing/
(last visited
Sept. 20, 2018).
111. D. Michael Risinger, Unsafe Verdicts: The Need for Reformed
Standards for the Trial and Review of Factual Innocence Claims, 41 HOUS. L.
REV. 1281, 1313-14 (2004).
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In virtually every American jurisdiction, when the sufficiency of
evidence to support a verdict is attacked, the rubric is the same
whether the case is civil or criminal. The party prevailing below is
entitled to every inference that a reasonable jury might have made
given the evidence on the record considered in its most favorable
light. This essentially means accepting at face value all testimonial
evidence in favor of the verdict and assuming all testimonial evidence
to the contrary to have been rejected on credibility grounds.112

Moreover, he notes that for “literally centuries,” American
courts have “insulated themselves from responsibility for protecting
the factually innocent, hiding behind an artificial concept of
evidentiary sufficiency, a misplaced apotheosis of direct witness
testimony, and deference to juries. It is time they realized that, in
regard to claims of factual innocence, justice demands more.”113
Lissa Griffin has similarly suggested broadening the U.S. standard
for evaluating claims of innocence based on new evidence to
resemble the standard currently applied in England.114 Under the
expanded standard, a court would be able to vacate a conviction
where the prosecution cannot show that conviction would have
resulted even given the new evidence.115
Second, other scholars have suggested establishing in the
United States a publicly accountable body similar to the English
Criminal Cases Review Commission, which was created following
the recommendations of the Runciman Commission Report and has
operated with considerable success over the years.116 The CCRC’s
mandate is to review claims of wrongful conviction and refer those
cases it deems suitable to the court of appeal, and the CCRC is
authorized to conduct extensive independent inquiries into
wrongful-conviction claims.117 This includes the authority to
subpoena public documents and seek disclosure of information that
is not available to the defense, as well as to request independent
reports from forensic and psychiatric experts.118 In practice, it does
as much fieldwork as practical on its own.119 I believe that
establishing in the United States an autonomous body along the
lines of the CCRC is likely to assist in contending with a number of
the problems discussed in this Essay.
A third suggestion made by scholars is to look to continental
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1335.
114. Griffin, supra note 6, at 1308.
115. Id.
116. The first one was probably Griffin, in 2001. Griffin, supra note 6;
Griffin, supra note 68; Keith A. Findley, Learning from Our Mistakes: A
Criminal Justice Commission to Study Wrongful Convictions, 38 CALIF. W. L.
REV. 332, 344-48 (2002).
117. Griffin, supra note 6, at 1275-78; Griffin, supra note 68, at 111-13. See
What we do, supra note 7 (describing the work of the CCRC).
118. Griffin, supra note 68, at 112.
119. Id. at 113.
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systems, such as the German legal system, where the appellate
court “starts over from scratch”: it hears witness testimony, it reexamines the evidence and relevant law, and it reaches its own
independent determinations.120 Such an appeal procedure is far
more thorough than what is accepted in the American system, and
the chances of correcting a wrongful conviction through such a
procedure significantly greater. Inspired by the continental appeal
procedure but presuming such a change to be too drastic for the
American system, Thomas has proposed the following compromise:
requiring appellate courts to determine from the trial transcripts
whether the prosecution provided sufficient evidence of the
defendant’s guilt, but leaving appeals of procedural errors to
continue as present.121 Under Thomas’s proposed solution,
defendants would have the right to request that the court review
the record and independently decide “if it has confidence in the
conviction”; to this end, the court could even direct the trial judge to
take new evidence if it finds it necessary. If the appellate court finds
that guilt was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, it will acquit
the defendant.122
Fourth, some authors have suggested strengthening the
clemency procedure, so that it will become an effective avenue for
gaining the release of innocent-convicted inmates.123 Echoing this
aspiration is the Herrera Court’s assertion that executive clemency
is a meaningful safeguard against wrongful convictions.124 The
Court insisted, furthermore, that one of the roles of clemency is to
prevent a miscarriage of justice when the legal process has been
exhausted.125
Executive clemency is entirely discretionary, however, and
generally not open to public scrutiny.126 State governors often even
fear that granting clemency will harm their chances of reelection.127 It is therefore hardly surprising that the empirical data
show that clemency fails to serve as a safety net due, among other
things, to political circumstances and forces.128 On this background,
it has been suggested that Congress and state legislatures establish
review bodies resembling the CCRC to investigate, assess, and
advise on clemency and pardon applications.129
On the one hand, I believe that the wrongly convicted deserve
not only physical release from imprisonment, but also a full clearing
120. THOMAS, supra note 69, at 216-17.
121. Id. at 217. See also Risinger, supra note 111, at 1313-14 (offering a
similar suggestion).
122. THOMAS, supra note 69, at 223-24.
123. Griffin, supra note 6, at 1299-300; Griffin, supra note 68, at 152.
124. Herrera, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
125. Id. at 411-12.
126. Griffin, supra note 6, at 1299.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1306.
129. Id.
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of their name in the framework of legal proceedings, such as a new
trial. On the other hand, so long as the present system is failing
(and, at times, not even trying) to live up to this ideal, clemency
should not be rejected as an alternative means of ending the
injustice. However, after release from prison through clemency, the
former inmate should be allowed, if he so desires, to pursue legal
proceedings to reveal the truth and fully clear his name.
I will close this discussion with two final thoughts on the role
of new trials. One idea is that the weaker the guarantees of a fair
trial, the greater the need to broaden the grounds for granting a
new trial. As is known regarding procedural causes of false
convictions in light of the findings of the Innocence Project, the
existing guarantees of a fair trial are not strong enough. Given that
the overwhelming majority of convictions are attained not through
trial proceedings but through plea bargains, and that the appeals
process is futile, principally because there is no scrutiny of the
factual determinations made at trial, there is an urgent need for an
effective new trial procedure.
The second point is that as is known about evidentiary causes
of false convictions, there seems to be a historical pattern whereby
with every new generation, there is an understanding that certain
types of evidence considered in the past to be strong proof of a
person’s guilt are, in fact, not particularly reliable and even
erroneous, and that they mislead judges and juries.130 Thus, they
should be given less weight than accorded in the past. The new trial
mechanism can and should be used, then, to correct miscarriages of
justice by reviewing past convictions and the evidence on which
they were based from the current, up-to-date perspective.

V.

CONCLUSION

There have always been, and always will be, accidents —
including false convictions. In some aspects of our life, this appears
to be an inevitable reality. However, a high rate of accidents is not
an unavoidable fact of life, but rather the product of human
negligence, or even indifference — when we are aware of the danger
but do not act purposefully to reduce it. Since safety theory and
safety measures are not yet developed in the criminal justice
system, we have to learn it from other areas, such as aviation,
transportation and engineering.
It is extremely difficult to correct an error after conviction. In
order to bring SAFETY to post-conviction proceedings, this Essay
offers some safety measures:
130. Thus, for example, The National Academy of Sciences 2009 report
uncovered “junk science” pretending to be scientific evidence: NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIS. CMTY. ET
AL., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH
FORWARD (2009).
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1. First and foremost, safety must be implemented not only
during the investigation and trial proceedings, but also
after conviction. The terms for allowing convicted
defendants access to DNA testing should be lenient, for
example, without setting any time limit on this access.
Ensuring the preservation of DNA samples after
conviction is also, therefore, vital.
2. Defense attorneys and defendants should be allowed to
submit potentially exculpatory evidence at all stages of
the process: at trial, on appeal, and in motions for a new
trial. This, of course, should not be limited only to DNA
evidence but should rather extend to any evidence that
can shed light on the truth.
3. It is vital that claims of actual innocence be investigated
at any stage that they are raised, without any time limit
or procedural obstacles. Post-conviction proceedings must
not be restricted to examining flaws of only a certain type,
such as violations of constitutional rights.
4. The (English law) “unsafe verdict” standard should be
adopted in post-conviction proceedings in which a claim of
actual innocence has been made.
5. A publicly accountable body similar to the English
Criminal Cases Review Commission should be
established in the United States too. Its mandate should
be to review claims of wrongful conviction and refer those
cases it deems suitable to the court of appeal. It should be
authorized to conduct extensive independent inquiries
into wrongful-conviction claims.
6. The appellate court should “start over from scratch” (as
done in the German legal system): it should hear witness
testimony, re-examine the evidence and relevant law, and
reach its own independent determinations. Such an
appeal procedure is far more thorough than what is
accepted in the American system, and the chances of
correcting a wrongful conviction through such a procedure
significantly greater.
7. The clemency procedure should be strengthened, so that
it will become an effective avenue for gaining the release
of innocent-convicted inmates.
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8. Developing a comprehensive safety theory for the
criminal justice system will require considerable
additional cross-disciplinary research work, which I
recommend be undertaken within the framework of a
Safety in the Criminal Justice System Institute
(“SCJSI”).131
It is my hope that this Essay succeeds to convince society of the
need to “THINK SAFETY” and to establish safety requirements
with the power to generate a truly positive change and to
significantly reduce the terrible phenomenon of false convictions.

131. Introducing modern safety into systems lacking a culture of safety
requires the establishment of a special institute to carry out this function, and
the securing of resources necessary for the new institute to operate in a
meaningful way. Thus, for example, in the field of aviation, the Federal Aviation
Administration (“FAA”) was established; in the field of transportation, the
National Transportation Board (“NTSB”) was founded; in the area of food and
drugs, there is the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”); the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) serves the occupational field; and
various such bodies were established in the medical field, such as the National
Center for Patient Safety (“NCPS”) and the Center for Patient Safety Research
and Practice. In all of these fields, the recognition of safety issues and the need
to improve performance led to national focus on safety leadership, the
development of a knowledge base, and the distribution of information, an
agenda to which substantial resources were devoted.

